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The writer was the White House Coordinator for Arms Management in 2009-13. He is currently the director of the Middle East Studies Crown Centre at Brandeis University.
After a 12-day war, US President Donald Trump declared on Tuesday that Iran would “never rebuild” its nuclear program. However, if the recent ceasefire leads to further negotiations over the country’s nuclear future, Iran may be willing to accept restrictions, but it is unlikely to formally waive its “right” to abundance. This includes accounting for remaining nuclear materials and equipment, as well as strengthened testing and restrictions on Iran’s “peaceful” nuclear activity.
However, US and Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities could drive Iran to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and “racial” to gain nuclear weapons. This is a logical conclusion for a nation that suffers from massive surprise attacks and needs reliable deterrent against the enemy of a good traditional force. Assuming that the Iranian regime survived this war, it will face a difficult decision, no matter how it will resume its long nuclear quest.
Iran’s strategy of gradually developing its ability to produce weapon-grade nuclear materials under the guise of a peaceful nuclear program was a grand failure, whilst delaying the decision to build actual weapons. Instead of stopping the military attack, they invited them. Alternative strategies for non-legal nuclear weapons have technical obstacles and security risks. It is unclear which route Iran will take. The country’s fundamental ability to acquire nuclear weapons will survive the events of the past 12 days. Eliminating some top scientists does not wipe out the technical knowledge of many nuclear experts, engineers and workers. Iran has the basic scientific and industrial infrastructure to rebuild the nuclear program if it makes a long-term political commitment.
Iran’s physical nuclear infrastructure is suffering dire damage, but it still has a large amount of enriched uranium. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the stockpile contains approximately 5,000 kg of low-enriched uranium and 400 kg of 60% of enriched uranium. Much of this stockpile appears to have been evacuated from Fordor before the US bomb collapsed.
However, the main enrichment facilities in Natantz and Ford, as well as related sites in Isfahan, do not seem to be operational anymore. Iran is unlikely to try and rebuild them as they will be closely scrutinized and subject to new attacks. Instead, it is more likely that they will use recovered components and spare centrifuges that could be hidden from the IAEA to construct a secret new enrichment facility. Production of new advanced centrifuges is difficult as Israel has destroyed known production facilities, including specialized equipment. Despite the severity of Dmitry Medvedev, vice-chairman of Russia’s Security Council, Russia is unlikely to offer nuclear warheads to Iran anywhere else.
Under the NPT, Iran has the right to withdraw three months after notifying all parties and the UN Security Council. (North Korea is the only other country to exercise this right.) For Iran, the advantage of withdrawal is that it is not subject to international testing. This means that we can pursue nuclear weapons that are less secret and vulnerable to future obstruction and military attacks. However, the practical issue is that Iran appears to be very pervasive by foreign spies. This may result in the lack of IAEA testing not providing much additional protection from exposure or detection.
There are other drawbacks to leaving the NPT. Iran’s withdrawal is seen as a declaration of intention to acquire nuclear weapons, and will likely be strongly opposed internationally, even by countries such as Russia and China, who criticized us and Israel’s attacks on Iran. Outside of the NPT, Iran becomes more vulnerable to sanctions and export controls that limit its ability to acquire the materials and equipment needed to rebuild its nuclear program. It will also be easier for the United States and Israel to justify future use of force.
Given these risks, it may be better for Iran to stay within the NPT and seek purely peaceful nuclear energy capabilities under international testing. However, as this war has shown, such an approach is not a guarantee against future attacks on ostensibly peaceful enrichment facilities.
