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Give me Yates, old man. “Center cannot be maintained.” “It all changed, completely changed.” Nigel Farage’s reforms in British local elections last week Britain’s victory split experts between the poetic exaggeration of those who see the end of politics as we knew it, and the yawning disparagement of those who argue that things are most likely to return to average.
No one can deny the sudden change. Since Brexit, British politics has become more European. Support for key parties is withering. There is merciless opposition to an unloved government. Voters were invited in multiple directions, and more than anything, Britain has acquired its own populist nationalist forces.
The UK has seen multi-party moments before. However, in the last general election, the combined labor and support for the Tories fell to just 57% from 82% in 2017. Last week it was barely outperforming a third. This feels more than a blip.
It is too early to say whether recent results reflect permanent changes in political architecture, or whether existing two layers simply reflect the flux period, as they change characters, or new facts and new furniture. However, the main parties must now operate in an alien landscape where old certainty is eroded.
One popular looting is that we are witnessing the end of politics for two. While Labour’s vote is in favor of the left, reforms are hitting conservatives. But while Farage’s Rise threatens the status quo, it is not clear whether the UK’s 100-year double layer has been irreparably crushed or is in a transition from the right outstanding unit to another author.
Although Britain certainly sees a reorganization on the right side of immigration and naturalistic politics (although reforms go against such a simple classification), it is a comparable pattern to that of many Western countries. The Tories had already moved significantly in this respect. Whether they are being replaced by reform or ultimately agree to some form of agreement.
One difference is that, in the words of senior workers’ figures, “opposition parties’ agendas are no longer set by official opposition.” For the first time in modern memory, the most energetic opposition comes with discourse set primarily outside the council, the county council and mayor, and social media. In the 1980s there was opposition from local governments to Thatcherism, but it was under a wide range of labor umbrellas. Farage has its advantages and disadvantages. It would be difficult to control his new regional corps, which could over-earn him and make him embarrassed. However, this base outside London changes the character of the debate and challenges the grassroots movement, in addition to the sense of outsiders. For this reason, reforms have already set agenda for both parties.
Then there is the changing impact of the UK’s first post-electoral system. This is why reforms support change, as they traditionally acted as a breakwater against rebels. It will interfere with new parties. Unless it’s very effective in local targeting, you should secure nearly 30% vote share before enjoying a major parliamentary breakthrough. However, if the parties are able to infringe this high ceiling, the system suddenly addresses their interests, provides hundreds of benefits, and disproportionately harm them. Last week, reform reached these levels.
However, existing electoral systems still negotiate against multi-party politics in the long run. New stakeholders reflect market gaps. The established parties then work to fill that gap, but change characters to do so. Labor could find himself under pressure to protect his left flank.
Navigation in this new landscape is further complicated by larger strategic questions. Historically, elections are won by occupying the centre. But the center is changing. Orthodox economics and progressive social policies are considered to have failed by many voters. The reorganization on the right side is due to this change in elections. Instead, the new median is a mixture of social conservatism and more left-leaning interventionist economics, evidenced by widespread support for nationalizing UK steel.
This change raises two issues: The first is whether there is still election space for two major parties in the traditional mainstream midstream, two major parties in the strong central part of the left and center, or, like most of the EU, this space can support only one major party.
The second is whether either side still wants that liberal central territory. The Conservatives and reforms largely abandoned it. If there is room for only one dominant party in this space, it is better for labour (mild Europeans, politically liberals, financially wise) to occupy it now.
But labor also follows the attraction of voter reform. It is struggling to identify it as a loser’s voice rather than a party of globalization, and bring together a coalition of successful liberals and inexpensive workers. They also fear voting to the left, particularly the Greens fragmentation. The big tent wasn’t necessarily what it was.
You can check that the route returns to normal (explosion of reform, labor recovery, Tory revival). But the old strategic certainty is disbanding. Part of the success of reforms so far is the faster the new election situation is. Meanwhile, the UK Big 2 looks like a foreign tourist.
robert.shrimsley@ft.com
